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NLSIR

TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
—Amal Sethi*

Abstract In very few countries worldwide, is constitutionalism confined to the apex court’s courtrooms, the way it is
in India. This facet of Indian political life has been taken so
much for granted that rarely have people stopped to examine whether it is even desirable. This article will argue that
on a closer examination, the Supreme Court is an inefficient
forum to realise the Constitution’s promises and more so in
today’s political climate. On the contrary, India’s Supreme
Court centric constitutionalism raises more challenges than
it resolves. This article will suggest that there is an urgent
need to usher in a revolution of constitutionalism outside the
Supreme Court, wherein the battles regarding the Constitution
are predominantly fought outside the Supreme Court rather
than within. While such arguments have been made in the
Anglo-American context, seldom have scholars advocated for
constitutionalism outside the courts in global south countries
like India, where courts are considered vital for constitutional
sustenance. In departing from this trend, this article will
demonstrate how although the Supreme Court might still have
a crucial role to play, ‘Taking The Constitution Away From
the Supreme Court’ is indispensable.

I. PROLOGUE
A distinctive trait of Indian public life is the crucial space the Supreme
Court of India1 (‘Supreme Court’) occupies. Starting with C. Golak Nath v.

*

1

Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author would like to thank Professor
Sophia Lee with whom discussions over the years led to thinking about ‘constitutionalism
outside the courts.’ The author would also like to thank Anchal Bhateja, Karthik Rai, and
Aditya Phalnikar for their invaluable assistance with this article.
The discussion surrounding the Supreme Court in this article is limited to its role as a constitutional court and not as a court of appeals for civil and criminal matters (even though at
times some overlaps might exist).
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State of Punjab2 in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court has been at the vanguard
of nearly all political, social, and economic controversies in India.3 With the
upswing of human rights litigation since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has cultivated tremendous public support.4
In India, the Supreme Court is considered a ‘beacon of hope’ and has regularly been asked to step in for inept governments. Relaxing the traditional
rules of procedure by allowing public-spirited individuals and organisations to
bring cases on behalf of the public5 and accepting letters as petitions6 added
to its allure. The Supreme Court has witnessed acclaim beyond India’s borders
as well, where scholars have considered it to be a prototype for constitutional
courts.7
Though recent decisions have raised some doubts regarding the Supreme
Court’s efficacy, its seat as the custodian of the Indian Constitution remains
unmoved.8 With India’s Constitution facing attacks from every corner in the
past few years,9 recourse to the Supreme Court has been the prime modus
operandi of those involved in protecting the same. Even during the COVID19 pandemic, it was the institution whose assistance was sought to tackle
the difficulties that surfaced.10 Considering Supreme Court’s role in India, it
would not be inaccurate to state that the Supreme Court largely shapes India’s
Constitution and its scope and meaning. Only in a handful of other democracies do apex courts occupy such a position.11
India’s Supreme Court Centric Constitutionalism (‘SCCC’) has been taken
so much for granted that rarely have people stopped to ask whether it is even
2
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See, the text body accompanying footnotes 37-38.
See generally, Lavanya Rajamani and Arghya Sengupta, ‘The Supreme Court’ in Niraja Gopal
Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Companion to Politics in India (OUP 2010)
80-97.
Sudhir Krishnaswamy and Siddharth Swaminathan, ‘Public Trust in the Indian Judiciary’
in Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Gerald Rosenberg and Shishir Bail (eds), A Qualified Hope: The
Indian Supreme Court and Progressive Social Change (CUP 2019) 123-145.
See, SP Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87.
See, Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 488 : AIR 1980 SC 1579.
See, David Landau, ‘A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role’ (2014) 55 Boston College Law
Review 1500.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘PB Mehta Writes: SC was Never Perfect, but the Signs are that it is
Slipping into Judicial Barbarism’ The Indian Express (18 November 2020).
See, Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive
Aggrandizement and Party-State Fusion in India’ (2020) 14(1) Law & Ethics of Human Rights
49, 49-95; See also, Rahul Mukherji ‘Covid vs. Democracy: India’s Illiberal Remedy’ (2020)
31(4) Journal of Democracy 91, 91–105.
Mihir Desai, ‘COVID-19 and The Indian Supreme Court’ Bloomberg Quint, (28 May 2020)
<https://www.bloombergquint.com/coronavirus-outbreak/covid-19-and-the-indian-supremecourt> accessed on 24 September 2020.
Peter Quint, ‘The Most Extraordinarily Powerful Court of Law the World has Ever Known?
Judicial Review in the United States and Germany’ (2006) 65 Maryland Law Review 152,
168.
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desirable. On a careful examination, SCCC raises more problems than it
resolves.12 SCCC is an inept system to attain the promises of the Constitution.
Without the power of the purse or sword, the Supreme Court has its limits
and cannot solve every problem or right every wrong. It is infeasible for the
Supreme Court to be the counter-majoritarian institution that it is expected to
be and aggressively confront the government at every turn.13 Doing so would
just put the Supreme Court in harm’s way and threaten its independence.14
In fact, the Supreme Court has often shied away when there were immediate threats to Indian democracy and arguably even contributed to its erosion.15
The Supreme Court also has institutional constraints that make it arduous to
achieve reforms through it.16 Despite the common perception of the Supreme
Court, its role in the realisation of rights and the protection of the Indian
Constitution is questionable at best.17 Barring a few decisions where there was
not much opposition from the government, its famed decisions have hardly
altered the ground realities on their own.18 The graver problems with SCCC
express themselves in subtler ways. SCCC has distorted the political process,
resulted in burdens on the average Indian, and led to popular estrangement
from the Constitution.19
Consequently, this article will contend how all concerned players should
gradually ensure ‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme Court.’
‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme Court’ would entail ushering
in a revolution of constitutionalism outside the courts where debates regarding the Indian Constitution’s interpretation and enforcement are predominately
decided outside the Supreme Court’s courtrooms and often with the active
involvement of nearly 1.4 billion Indians. This would certainly not be an easy
change to the status quo and would require some serious investment in formal
organisations (including but limited to civil society organisations).
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See generally, part II.
See, the text body accompanying footnotes 26-35.
ibid.
See, ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 (holding that during the proclamation of emergency the writ of habeas corpus is suspended) (‘ADM Jabalpur’); See also, AP
Shah, ‘The Only Institution Capable of Stopping the Death of Democracy is Aiding it’ (The
Wire, 18 September 2020) <https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-rights-uapa-bjp-nda-masterof-roster> accessed 24 September 2020.
See, the text body accompanying footnotes 46-72.
See, Krishnaswamy (n 4) 345-357; See also, Pratap Bhanu Mehta ‘India’s Judiciary: The
Promise of Uncertainty’, in Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Devesh Kapur (eds), Public Institutions
in India: Performance and Design (OUP 2007) 158-167.
For example, see, Vinay Sitapati, After Judgment Day: Under What Conditions are Court
Decisions Implemented? (Princeton University 2017) 240-256; See also, Rosalind Dixon and
Rishad Chowdhury, ‘A Case for Qualified Hope?’ in Krishnaswamy (n 4) 243-258.
See, the text body accompanying footnotes 74-84.
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A clarification is worth offering upfront. Unlike scholars in the AngloAmerican context, like Mark Tushnet, Jeremy Waldron, and Larry Kramer,20
this article does not call for stripping the Supreme Court of judicial supremacy or adopting a weak form of judicial review framework.21 Neither does it
demand not making use of the Supreme Court at all. As will be discussed later
in this article, the Supreme Court can still play an integral role irrespective of
its shortcomings.22 Even otherwise, as a practical matter, a global south country like India cannot successfully operate without judicial supremacy or in a
weak form of the judicial review framework.23 What this article will suggest
is not making the Supreme Court the prime venue for deciding every constitutional question.24 Our expectations about what the Supreme Court can do to
fulfil the promises of the Constitution, need to be toned down.
The rest of the article will proceed as follows: Part II of this article will
highlight the challenges of SCCC and describe how these challenges have
reared their heads repeatedly in India. Part III of this article will illustrate how,
in addition to the challenges of SCCC discussed in Part II, SCCC is not a viable strategy today because of the political climate India finds itself in. Part IV
of this article will suggest ‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme
Court’ and describe what that could look like in India. Part v. of this article
will provide the concluding remarks.

II. THE CHALLENGES OF SUPREME COURT
CENTRIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
Courts’ decision-making abilities have restrictions. Counter to what legalists and activists would prefer, courts cannot and do not decide cases merely
according to the law and without paying attention to the socio-political environment in which they operate.25 As institutions dependent on the government
for their functioning, the boundaries of a court’s decision-making are determined by what Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Olga Shvetsova term as the

20
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See, Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (PUP 1999) (‘Tushnet’);
See also, Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999); See also, Larry Kramer, The
People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (OUP 2004).
This is a framework that either does not allow courts to declare laws unconstitutional or
allows the Government to reject and ‘override’ constitutional rulings of the judiciary by simple majority. See, Walter Sinott-Armstrong, ‘Weak and Strong Judicial Review’ (2003) 22 Law
& Philosophy 381.
See, Amal Sethi, ‘Towards a Pluralistic Conception of Judicial Role’ (2021) 91(1) University
of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3545792> accessed on 24 September 2020.
David Landau, ‘Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitution Law’
(2010) 51(2) Harvard International Law Journal 320, 323-335.
See generally, part IV.
See, Tom Clark, The Limits of Judicial Independence (CUP 2010).
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‘tolerance interval’ of the government.26 Simply put, the government will
endure an independent court only when they see some benefit in having one or
when the backlash of curtailing courts is too extreme.27
When courts decide profusely against the interests of the government and
the public is not behind the court or, worse, is against it, there is not much in
the government’s way to prevent them from curbing courts and compromising
their independence.28 As a result, to ensure that they do not put strain on their
‘reservoir of goodwill’29 and fall outside the government’s ‘tolerance interval,’
courts over protracted periods (1) limit their decisions against the government
to ensure that the latter does not see a net negative in maintaining an independent court (2) decide as many cases as possible in favour of the government
to make it see a value in maintaining an independent court (3) largely stay in
line with majoritarian preferences to avoid public backslash (4) issue multiple low-stakes human rights and other popular judgements to cultivate public
support.30
Further, in order to confirm that their overall decision-making does not
significantly impact their position within the government’s ‘tolerance interval’, Samuel Issacharoff and Rosalind Dixon show how courts make use of
deferral strategies and avoidance cannons such as obiters, prospective overruling, justiciability requirements, the political question doctrine, unconstitutional but not void holdings, weak enforcement strategies, etc.31 These tools
are utilised by courts so that, in order to maintain their position within the
26

27

28
29

30

31

Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Olga Shvetsova, ‘The Role of Constitutional Courts in the
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government’ (2001) 35(1) Law &
Society Review 117, 117-136.
In countries where the executive and legislature are controlled by different parties, this equation becomes a little more complicated as competing interests often clash. However, considering India has a parliamentary system with a fused executive and legislature, the judicial
independence equation can be simplified to this account. See, Georg Vanberg, ‘Establishing
and Maintaining Judicial Independence’ in Keith Whittington and Daniel Kelemen (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2008) 103-105; See also, Keith Whittington,
‘Legislative Sanctions and The Strategic Environment of Judicial Review’ (2003) 1
International Journal of Constitutional Law 446.
ibid.
See, Diana Kapiszewski and others, ‘Of Judicial Ships and Winds of Change’ in Diana
Kapiszewski and others (eds), Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective
(CUP 2013) 493, (explaining how elected branches deference to judicial authority is not contingent on the immediate outputs of the case at hand but rather the support elected branches
and the people have on it in the long run – also called its ‘reservoir of goodwill’. A court
without a reservoir of goodwill, they suggest, may be limited in their ability to defy the preferences of the majority or the elected branches. A court can build its reservoir of goodwill
by deciding in favour of majorities, popular minorities, or the elected branches over time.
Conversely it can take away from its reservoir of goodwill by doing the contrary).
See, Sethi (n 22) 18-22; See also, Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, The Choices Justices Make
(Sage Publications 1998); See also Epstein (n 28); See also, Vanberg (n 29).
See, Samuel Issacharoff and Rosalind Dixon, ‘Living to Fight Another Day: Judicial Deferral
in Defense of Democracy’ (2016) 16(1) Wisconsin Law Review 683, 683-731.
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government’s ‘tolerance interval’, they are not forced to compromise on principle and render judgments that go contrary to a polity’s law.32 Doing so could
have consequences for the rule of law, which courts would want to avoid at all
costs.33 These are not contentious assertions regarding the operation of courts.
Decades of social science scholarship backs this model of judicial behaviour,
and there is unanimous consensus that these are the considerations that guide
the function of courts that have managed to maintain their independence.34
India’s Supreme Court is undoubtedly no exception to this. The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudential history is laden with the usage of deferral strategies and
avoidance cannons. Additionally, it has seldom35 gone brazenly counter-majoritarian or in great opposition to the government’s key policy initiatives. In
the previously mentioned Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court
laid down critical law and held that the government could not curtail fundamental rights.36 Yet, in the same case, the Supreme Court did not halt the
government’s attempt to limit fundamental rights, and the petitioner did not
get any relief as the court made use of the tool of prospective overruling and
did not make its reasoning applicable to the case at hand.37 The story was
repeated in other cases considered to have changed the landscape of Indian
Constitutionalism like Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,38 Minerva
Mills Ltd v. Union of India,39 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,40 where
the Supreme Court established ground-breaking jurisprudence through avoidance cannons and deferral strategies but left the petitioners wanting. All these
cases expanded the Supreme Court’s powers and clarified the scope of the
Constitution in the abstract.
A common thread with many resonant human rights decisions is the ‘rights
without serious remedies’ scenario, wherein the Supreme Court declared rights
not stipulated in the written Constitution but simultaneously, did not offer any
32

33

34

35

36
37
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40

See, Alexander Bickel, ‘The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues’
(1961) 75 Harvard Law Review 40.
Cf Gerald Gunther, ‘The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”- A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review’ (1964) 64(1) Columbia Law Review 1, 1-25.
See, Georg Vanberg, ‘Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective: A Theoretical
Assessment’ (2015) 18 Annual Review of Political Science 167, 167-185.
Two notable decisions in stark opposition to key policies of the Government are Madhav Rao
Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85 (declaring a presidential order abolishing privy purses to be unconstitutional) and Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India
(1970) 1 SCC 248 : (1970) 3 SCR 530 (holding unconstitutional the governments much touted
Banking Companies Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking Act).
AIR 1967 SC 1643 : (1967) 2 SCR 762.
ibid.
(1973) 4 SCC 225 (holding that the parliament cannot alter the basic structure of the
Constitution).
(1980) 3 SCC 625 (holding that the parliament cannot alter its power to amend the
Constitution).
(1978) 1 SCC 248 (holding that the right to life under the Constitution has a substantive component as well).
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substantial remedies.41 The Supreme Court has, through such ‘noise around
zero’ decisions, coupled with several low-stakes public interest decisions where
it did not force the government to undertake action it was not ready to perform,42 ensured that there is a high level of confidence in the Supreme Court.43
However, in some of the most decisive moments in history when fundamental
freedoms were put under enormous strain, such as during the emergency of the
1970s, the Supreme Court found its hands tied.44
This is not a criticism of the Supreme Court’s historical performance. The
Supreme Court was compelled to engage in such decision-making to navigate turbulent tides. It is a praiseworthy achievement that the Supreme Court
managed to preserve its independence and render judgments that were not
wholly meaningless and had some tangible impact (even if relatively small).
Nevertheless, the institutional limitations of the Supreme Court should not be
overlooked. The Supreme Court can and does play a vital role in a country
such as India, but it has a limited ‘tolerance interval’. This limitation makes
the Supreme Court an insufficient venue to fight battles, especially when they
are severely misaligned with government interests or majoritarian preferences.
Limits to decision-making abilities are just one small facet of the challenges with SCCC. SCCC is plagued by the Supreme Court’s several institutional capacity deficits as well. To start with, the Supreme Court is dependent
on the government to enforce its decisions. If there is an indifference or
41

42

43

44

For example, see, Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 (declaring right to shelter and livelihood to be a fundamental right); See also, KS Puttaswamy v.
Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 (declaring right to privacy to be a fundamental right) (‘KS
Puttaswamy’); See also, Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666 (declaring right
to education to be a fundamental right); See also, Consumer Education & Research Centre
v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42 (declaring right to health and medical care to be a fundamental right); See also, Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC
294 (declaring right to information to be a fundamental right); See also, Anuradha Bhasin
v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637 (declaring internet access to be essential to Freedom of
Speech and Freedom of Trade); Subash Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991) 1 SCC 598 (declaring
the right to enjoyment of pollution free air and water as a fundamental right).
For example, see, Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1997) 10 SCC 549 (issuing directions for the welfare of bonded labourers); See also, Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC
141 (providing compensation for illegal detention); See also, Paschim Banga Khet Samity v.
State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37 (providing compensation for loss suffered due to inadequate medical facilities); See also, Nilabati Behara v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 (providing compensation for death suffered due to custodial torture); See also, Vineet Narain v.
Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 (issuing directions for the reform of the Central Bureau of
Investigation); See also, MC Mehta v. Union of India (1992) 3 SCC 256 (monitoring the construction of sewage treatment plants).
Cf Rohit De, A People’s Constitution: The Everyday Life of Law in the Indian Republic (PUP
2018) (De describes a positive account of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Yet a closer
look at the cases he covers illustrates a perfect fit with this standard model of judicial behaviour. All those cases were low-stakes and/or not significantly at odds with governmental or
majoritarian preferences).
ADM Jabalpur (n 15).
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opposition from the government, there is not much the Supreme Court can do
to compel the government to comply with its orders.45 Two of the most widely
applauded decisions of the Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan46
and D.K. Basu v. State of W.B.,47 did not see any enforcement by the government, mainly out of indifference. When the promise of Vishaka finally materialised almost two decades later in the form of The Sexual Harassment of
Women at Workplace Act, it was because of the pressure on the government
to take immediate action in the wake of a heinous rape incident in the capital city. Likewise, in the Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India48 case,
the Supreme Court had ordered individuals displaced by the Narmada Dam’s
construction to be provided with cultivable land and quality housing. As Vinay
Sitapati has demonstrated via significant empirical research, due to the lack
of state capacity and the indifference to overcome the same on the government’s part, of the 43,201 families displaced by the construction of the Dam
in Madhya Pradesh, only nine families received the Supreme Court mandated
reparation.49
The complexities in the face of opposition from the government are much
higher. Dance bars occupied a pivotal role in the cultural life of Mumbai. In
an instance of moral policing, the government had banned these bars in 2005.
Despite Supreme Court decisions in 201350 and 201951 declaring various aspects
of the ban to be unconstitutional, these dance bars never reopened because of
the government’s opposition to the Supreme Court’s orders.52 Many of these
bars have either shut down, leading to job losses or now operate as orchestra
bars.53 Similarly, in the monumental Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano
Begum54 case, where the Supreme Court held that Muslim women are entitled
to maintenance post-divorce, not only did the government refuse to implement the decision, but they also passed and enforced legislation overruling the
judgement.55 Even during the 1960s-70s, when the Supreme Court invalidated
several land reform laws, the government kept overruling the court’s decisions

45

46

47

48
49
50
51
52

53
54
55

Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (University of
Chicago Press 1991) 4.
(1997) 6 SCC 241 (laying down guidelines for sexual harassment in the workplace in India
which had the force of law till the parliament came up with a legislation).
(1997) 1 SCC 416 (laying down guidelines for preventing custodial violence which had the
force of law till the parliament came up with a legislation).
(2000) 10 SCC 664.
Sitapati (n 18) 241-242.
State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel & Restaurant Association (2013) 8 SCC 519.
Indian Hotel & Restaurant Association v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 3 SCC 429.
Mohua Das, Mateen Hafeez, and Chittaranjan Thembekar, ‘The Story of Mumbai’s MoneySpinning Dance Bars’ The Economic Times (18 January 2019).
ibid.
(1985) 2 SCC 556.
Vrinda Narain, Reclaiming the Nation: Muslim Women and the Law in India (University of
Toronto Press 2008) 123-124.
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by passing constitutional amendments.56 This trend finally continued till the
Supreme Court relented and embraced the government’s policy preferences.57
Even if the Supreme Court can get its decisions enforced by the government, which might have their own agendas to enforce them, there are still
reasons why SCCC faces challenges. The Supreme Court is a highly elitist
institution that is unable to account for even a fraction of the different voices
and stakeholders in polycentric debates. When vital matters of public life are
decided in the Supreme Court rather than deliberative forums, the bulk of the
citizenry is deprived of the opportunity to shape important questions.58 This
ends up favouring those actors with specific knowledge, better access to, and
influence upon the legal system, at the expense of much of the populace who
rarely have a voice in matters.59
This deficiency has persisted even when the Supreme Court has tried to
remedy its capacity defects by seeking the assistance of amicus curiaes, civil
society organisations, and instituting expert/policy-evaluation/fact-finding/monitoring committees to aid their decision making. As Anuj Bhuwania, in one
of the most comprehensive empirical studies of the Supreme Court, showed,
many of the major Public Interest Litigations (‘PILs’) where the Supreme Court
tried to remedy its capacity defects, were still unable to account for all sides in
polycentric debates and often did not hear those individuals most impacted by
the decisions.60
In the cases covered by Bhuwania’s study, the outcomes of the PILs did not
benefit the ‘public’ but instead were geared to improve the quality of life for
the elite middle and upper class of India.61 On the contrary, the outcomes of
those PILs led to unwarranted and unsubstantiated financial burdens on the
everyday Indian.62 For example, Bhuwania showed how PILs became a tool
to carry out slum demolitions all over Delhi, leading to the displacement of
over three million people without providing any alternative housing sites to
the slum residents.63 According to the Supreme Court, providing alternative
sites of housing was self-defeating and “it has only created a mafia of property
56

57
58

59

60
61
62
63

Manoj Mate, ‘Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of
India’, in Kapiszewski (n 29) 265-270.
ibid.
Ran Hirschl, ‘Resituating the Judicialization of Politics: Bush v. Gore as a Global Trend’
(2002) 15 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 191, 214.
ibid; See also, Anuj Bhuwania, Courting the People: Public Interest Litigation in PostEmergency India (CUP 2017); See also, David Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights
Enforcement’ (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal 189, 209; Octavio Luiz Motta
Ferraz, ‘Harming the Poor Through Social Rights Litigation: Lessons from Brazil’ (2011) 89
Texas Law Review 1643, 1660– 61.
Bhuwania (n 59) 120.
ibid 50-111.
Bhuwania (n 59) 55-56, 60-61, 80.
Bhuwania (n 59) 88.
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developers and builders who have utilised this policy to encourage squatting
on public land, get alternative sites and purchase them to make further illegal
constructions”. In several of these cases, the Supreme Court did not give any
legal reasoning and made statements such as “if action was not taken immediately…the slum dwellers would soon invade the court premises itself and squat
there.”64
A considerable part of India’s SCCC has been using the forum of the
Supreme Court to try and get socio-economic policies pushed. The Supreme
Court at several junctures has been asked to adjudicate on public policy questions customarily reserved for the exclusive domain of the government, such
as healthcare, environment, education, food security, housing, etc.65 Worth discussing is a significant capacity concern that underscores this trend as well.
Courts like the Supreme Court are generally poor policymakers.66 They lack
the ability to study situations and ground recommendations empirically.67 They
are also unable to carry out investigations regarding the realities of a particular situation on their own.68 More often than not, their intervention into policy
questions opens a pandora’s box of predicaments and ends up making a mess
of things.
In no recent case was this more evident than the one dealing with migrant
rights during the COVID-19 pandemic. Curiously, even in this case, the
Supreme Court heard every voice except that of the migrant workers.69
According to a governmental ordinance, all employers were directed to pay
full wages to their employees during the COVID-19 pandemic induced lockdown.70 In the wake of this ordinance, a petition was filed in the Supreme
Court by a trade union challenging this ordinance’s constitutionality.71 The
Supreme Court put a stay on this ordinance.72 With no guaranteed pay and
no end to the pandemic in view, several million migrant workers left for their
hometowns, often travelling thousands of kilometres on foot. This resulted in a
full-blown crisis.
64
65
66

67

68
69

70
71

72

ibid 7.
See generally, Rajamani and Sengupta (n 3) 80-97.
See, Lon Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review
353, 394–95; See also, Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India:
Exploring Issues of Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability’ 2007 19(3)
Journal of Environmental Law 293.
Christopher Elmendorf, ‘Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts’ (2007) 56 Duke
Law Journal 953, 997.
Rosenberg (n 45) 4.
Anuj Bhuwania, ‘The Curious Absence of Law in Migrant Workers’ Cases’ (Article 14, 16
June 2020) <https://www.article-14.com/post/the-curious-absence-of-law-in-india-s-migrantworkers-cases> accessed 24 September (Bhuwania: Article 14) 2020.
Government of India: Ministry of Home Affairs 2020, Order No 40-3/2020-DM-I (1).
Hand Tools Manufacturers Association v. Union of India (2020) Writ Petition (Civil) Diary
No(s) 11193 of 2020 (Pending) (SC).
ibid.

VOL. 33

TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

11

Later, when the crisis showed no sign of subsiding, the Supreme Court
passed a suo motu order, where it asked the government to take urgent steps
to resolve the crisis73 – which the government, from its end was already doing,
in whatever questionable manner, it deemed fit. The Supreme Court does not
deserve all the blame for the migrant crisis; inadequate and uncoordinated governmental policies were primarily responsible for the same. Nonetheless, its
initial intervention into the issue did nothing to alleviate the crisis and arguably contributed to its exacerbation.
In addition to limits on decision-making abilities and capacity concerns,
SCCC is plagued by a few minor complications that do not bode well for constitutional governance.74 The first of these is judicial overhang.75 This is the
phenomenon in which, considering that courts are the primary forum to decide
constitutional questions, legislatures stop taking the Constitution and their
law-making functions seriously. in the belief that the court will decide major
constitutional questions.76 Such situations often see governments avoiding political responsibility for making tough decisions.77 It also witnesses governments
shifting the blame for controversial decisions on the courts or using courts to
forward contentious policy agendas that are not easy to advance through open
legislative and electoral politics.78
The BJP government has frequently been doing the same, as can be
observed in examples dealing with two of the BJP government’s most prominent election promises, i.e., Constructing the Ram Temple and Banning the
Islamic Practice of Triple Talaq. With both these issues, the BJP government
could have pursued their agendas by legislation but avoided the political costs
associated with democratic decision-making as the Supreme Court was willing to adjudicate these matters. Curiously, in many cases which involve such
vital issues, government lawyers frequently make arguments grounded in
73
74

75
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77

78
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These complications are in addition to the commonly argued anti-democratic nature of judicial review which thwarts the voice of peoples elected representatives (See, Alexander Bickel,
The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (YUP 1986) 16-17).
However, scholars’ have contended that due to the dysfunctional nature of electoral politics,
this concern does not have the same sting in global south democracies like India (See, Kim
Lane Scheppele, ‘Democracy by Judiciary: Or Why Courts Can Be More Democratic than
Parliaments’ in Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier, and Wojciech Sadurski, Rethinking the Rule
of Law After Communism (CEU Press 2005) 25-60; See also, Landau (n 6) 1503. Nonetheless,
the anti-democratic nature of judicial review has been bought up even in the Indian context as
well (See, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty’ in Sumit Ganguly, Larry
Diamond, and Marc Plattner (eds), The State of India’s Democracy (JHU Press 2007) 117).
Tushnet (n 20) 57–65.
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See, James Bradley Thayer, ‘The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law’ (1893) 7 Harvard Law Review 129, 156.
Keith Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the
Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in US History (Princeton University Press
2007) 139.

12

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

33 NLSI R ev. (2021)

‘separation of powers’ as to why the Supreme Court should not decide these
cases.79 However, in both the cases described above, this was not the case,
alluding to the fact that the BJP government would rather have the Supreme
Court make the determinations.
Apart from judicial overhang, countries in which apex courts strongly shape
constitutionalism see a serious distrust for the government.80 As they have
done in India, courts frequently use the rhetoric of representing the people’s
interests and being more democratic than the government to justify their interventions.81 This could cause people to doubt the elected officials, which has the
potential to fracture the political process in ways from which it is not easy to
recover. People might lose interest in civic life, believing that the political process is beyond redemption and might not feel incentivised to engage in political activities. This is precisely one of the reasons why ‘Taking the Constitution
Away from the Supreme Court’ does not have a similar allure in India as it
has in some other developed countries. The citizenry cannot envision anything
good coming via the government and feel that the Supreme Court is their only
resort. The most common objection, I expect to this article’s suggestion of
‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme Court’, is precisely this. As
this article will later cover at length, this is an inflated concern and one that
should surely not deter people from ‘Taking the Constitution Away from the
Supreme Court’.
Akin to the issue mentioned above, SCCC can also lead to popular
estrangement from the Constitution. When constitutional decision-making
becomes the prerogative of a few unelected elites sitting in the capital city, the
average individual seeing no realistic probability of influencing the course of
constitutional decision-making, does not try or, worse, ceases to care about the
Constitution.82 Citizens often start treating the Constitution no longer as a set
of defining norms but rather as a remote set of “rules and regulations made by
79
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See, Scheppele (n 74) 49; See also, Julio Faundez, ‘Democratization Through Law:
Perspectives from Latin America’ (2005) 12 Democratization 749, 758; See also, Elena
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and Guatemala’ (2010) 3 Mexican Law Review 3, 3, 5–6.
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an elite group of lawyers and judges”, which ultimately leads to estrangement
from the Constitution.83
While there are, to my knowledge, no empirical studies illustrating this phenomenon in India, the popular estrangement from the Constitution is evident in
India in a manner similar to those in the comparative context. A major sign of
this is that discourse outside the legal fraternity is very rarely framed in terms
of constitutional rights but is rather done as an appeal to emotions, beliefs, and
needs. The everyday politician or the common Indian very rarely speaks in
constitutional terms. Policies and demands are not marketed as Articles 14, 15,
16, 19, or 21 rights. In comparison, in a country such as the United States of
America, where there is a relatively higher constitutional culture, key debates
such as those relating to religion, gun rights, or government powers are frequently framed in constitutional terms.
This part highlighted the manifold complications with SCCC. There is a
possibility that all these challenges that were raised with SCCC might still not
convince concerned actors to rethink their SCCC. They might still believe that
the Supreme Court is a forum where they will be heard and would prefer to
fight their battles in the Supreme Court. They might also consider that politics
is highly dysfunctional, and hence the Supreme Court might be a better forum
to decide several questions. In turn, in the next part, this article will demonstrate that even if the concerns with SCCC are overstated, given the current
political climate, the Supreme Court is not a viable venue to safeguard the soul
of India’s Constitution.

III. THE SUPREME COURT TODAY
During periods of electoral uncertainty, courts generally have a wider tolerance interval84 to operate. This is because there is not enough public support
behind incumbents to conduct court curbing measures without facing a backlash.85 Coalition members and opposition parties who have a considerable influence in such scenarios might also not support such measures.86 Additionally,
governing parties may themselves be willing to tolerate an independent court
if they expect that the court will protect their own interests if they find themselves in the opposition.87 This also explains how the Supreme Court managed
to be activist without having to toe the government’s line in the decade’s post
the 1980s, when the Indian National Congress (‘INC’) was no longer the only
game in town.
83
84
85
86
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Since 2014, India is rapidly descending again towards a dominant party
state. The Bharatiya Janata Party (‘BJP’) led coalition controls over 60% of the
parliament with a marginal near-future probability of losing its dominance at
the centre. In such a backdrop, the Supreme Court has a very small ‘tolerance
interval’ to work with. India’s electoral condition has certainly resulted in the
BJP government being able to easily engage in court curbing actions without
any sizeable political or electoral backlash.88
In India, judicial appointments are in the hands of a committee of Senior
Judges of the Supreme Court called the ‘collegium’, who send their nominations for judicial appointments to the Ministry of Law and Justice (‘MoLJ’).
The MoLJ does a background check of the nominated judges and then resends
the nominations with its findings back to the collegium, along with its additional recommendations for judges. The collegium then considers these findings and recommendations and gives its final nomination to the MoLJ, on
whom these nominations are binding. Post final approval from the MoLJ, the
President of India officially appoints judges.
During the early days of the BJP government’s first term, the MoLJ had
stalled approving the nomination of Senior Advocate Gopal Subramaniam’s
appointment to the Supreme Court in what was perceived as a retaliation to
his involvement in a case which concerned senior BJP leader Amit Shah.89
In another instance, the MoLJ delayed the Supreme Court of Justice Kurian
Joseph’s elevation, who, as a High court Judge, had issued decisions against
the BJP’s interests.90 Only after much outcry did the MoLJ confirm his
appointment after a delay of eight months, resulting in Justice Kurian Joseph
losing his seniority in a court where seniority holds sway.91
The MoLJ had, during this same period, continued approving judges nominated along with Justice Kurian Joseph.92 In fact, when judges sympathetic
to the government were nominated, the MoLJ cleared their appointments
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within two days.93 These are not isolated incidents and have been witnessed at
all levels of judicial appointments.94 Furthermore, while the BJP government
has interfered with judges’ appointments not aligned with their interests, it
rewarded sympathetic Chief Justices, who in India command significant control
over judicial appointments,the court’s docket and composition of its benches,
with political posts immediately after they retired from the Supreme Court.95
A causative outcome of the government’s interference in appointments is
that the Supreme Court today comprises of several judges who ardently support the BJP agenda.96 This changing dynamic has resulted in the polyvocal97
Supreme Court not shying away on occasions from siding with the BJP government’s nationalist agenda and imbuing it with a veneer of judicial legitimacy.98 In the past, the Supreme Court generally avoided adjudicating exceedingly
sensitive topics that could affect the delicate balance of secularism in India.
This is not the case anymore.
The obvious contender to lead this charge against the Supreme Court has
been its decision on the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya. A hotly
contested issue over the past couple of decades and one of the main electoral
promises of the BJP government was the construction of a Ram Temple on the
site of the demolished Babri Mosque. No political resolution of this issue had
been possible, and the Supreme Court had refused to adjudicate on it up until
now. The Supreme Court overruled the Allahabad High Court decision, which
had provided for a distribution of land between the Hindu and Muslim parties
to construct their respective place of worships.99 It instead allowed for a sole
Hindu temple on the site of the demolished mosque.100
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A different story but with a comparable outcome was witnessed in the
Sabarimala Temple controversy. In 2018, the Supreme Court had ruled that
the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala cannot bar the entry of women to the temple.101 The BJP-led centre sided with temple authorities and mounted a massive political campaign against the Supreme Court judgement.102 Soon after, the
Supreme Court had a change of mind and referred certain questions pertaining
to the judgement to a larger bench.103 It consequently held that pending referral, the original judgement was not the ‘final word’.104 Besides, the Supreme
Court even refused to issue an interim order on a petition to provide security
for women entering the Sabrimala temple.105 It is to be seen when this larger
bench eventually decides the matter, if at all. For the time being, the net results
of these developments mean that what was supposed to be a final decision of
the Supreme Court has been rendered meaningless.
The process of not taking up a case or leaving a case on its docket to prevent giving a decision has been part of a broader strategy of the Supreme
Court of not deciding against the government in times where the court has a
very low ‘tolerance interval’. This tactic has been given the term’ judicial evasion’ by Gautam Bhatia, a prominent commentator on Indian Constitutional
Law.106 The Supreme Court has utilised it in several contentious cases involving key BJP policies, such as during the demonetisation saga, the trifurcation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the passing of the Citizenship
Amendment Act (‘CAA’). In all these cases, the Supreme Court gave the government the upper hand by not adjudicating the issues.
These judicial evasions have also resulted in instances of the Supreme Court
turning a blind eye to the curtailment of constitutional rights in the country.
In the wake of the trifurcation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in August
2019, the government put several opposition leaders in Jammu and Kashmir
such as Omar Abdullah, Mehbooba Mufti, and Shah Faesal under preventive
detention as well as blocked internet services in the state. With the preventive
detentions, the leaders were initially detained without any charges under the
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Criminal Procedure Code.107 Just before the expiry of the maximum permitted six months period under the Code, the leader’s detentions were extended
under a separate Act.108 Despite the habeas corpus petitions filed in the
Supreme Court, the court delayed adjudicating upon the petitions till as late as
March 2020, when Abdullah was finally released. The other leaders continue
to be detained at the time of writing of this article, and the Supreme Court has
stayed silent.109
The same can be seen with the government blocking internet services in the
state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Supreme Court allowed the internet blockage to go on, and only in January 2020, in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India,
adjudicated upon the matter. In this case, while it held that suspension of communication services should comply with standards of necessity and proportionality, it did not rule upon the merits of the matter.110 Instead, it handed over the
deciding of the legality of the blockade to a governmental review committee
headed by the executive.111 The state of Jammu and Kashmir still faces internet
restrictions of varying orders, and in further challenges to the internet blockage, the Supreme Court has refused to alter the status quo.112 Even in May
2020, it dodged adjudication on the legality of the internet blockage by stating that threats of terrorism in the state give rise to special circumstances that
might warrant actions on the grounds of national security.113
The passing of the CAA was followed by widespread protests all over the
country.114 These protests were handled violently by the government and were
accompanied by the arrests of individuals involved in these protests.115 Like
in other instances, the Supreme Court has evaded adjudicating upon petitions with respect to the protestors.116 When state high courts gave judgements
favouring protestors, on appeal, the Supreme Court has kept these cases hanging, thereby rendering the finality of the high court judgements in doubt.117 The
107

108
109

110
111
112
113
114
115

116

117

‘Omar, Mehbooba Booked Under PSA on Last Day of Their Detention’ The Times of India (6
February 2020).
ibid.
Apoorva Mandhani, ‘Rejected, Infructuous, Pending — Status of Pleas in SC, HC Against
Detention of J&K Leaders’ (The Print, 2 August 2020) <https://theprint.in/judiciary/rejectedinfructuous-pending-status-of-pleas-in-sc-hc-against-detention-of-jk-leaders/473069/> accessed
24 September 2020.
Anuradha Bhasin (n 41).
ibid.
Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of J&K (2020) 5 SCC 746.
ibid.
Anjali Mody, ‘India Awakens to Fight for its Soul’ The New York Times (20 December 2019).
Sameer Yasir and Kai Schultz, ‘India Rounds Up Critics Under Shadow of Virus Crisis,
Activists Say’ The New York Times (19 July 2020).
Sruthisagar Yamunan, ‘Supreme Court to Tiz Hazari: How the Judiciary Responded to CAA
Protests and Police Action’ (Scroll, 24 December 2019) <https://scroll.in/article/947770/
supreme-court-to-tiz-hazari-how-the-judiciary-responded-to-caa-protests-and-police-action>
accessed 24 September 2020.
Shah (n 15).

18

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

33 NLSI R ev. (2021)

most prominent of these cases was perhaps from the State of Uttar Pradesh. In
Uttar Pradesh, the protestors’ photographs were put on hoardings by the government, and they were subsequently targeted.118 The Allahabad High Court
had directed that these hoardings be pulled down within 24 hours, calling it an
“unwarranted interference in the privacy of people.”119 The Uttar Pradesh government appealed to the Supreme Court, who subscribed to the High Court’s
reasoning, but still directed the case for reference to a larger bench stating that
the case pertained to “issues which need further consideration by a bench of
sufficient strength.”120 Beyond overlooking the cases dealing with protestors,
recently the Supreme Court in Amit Sahni v. Commr of Police, stated that protests can only take place in government-designated areas and that protestors
do have right to occupy public places for protests as that could inconvenience
others.121
This trend of the Supreme Court not guarding constitutional rights has
been observed across the board. The Supreme Court denied bail, contrary to
the accepted rules regarding issuing bails, to an analyst who posted a satirical tweet about a Hindu Temple.122 During the hearings, the Chief Justice sarcastically commented that the best place for the accused would be in jail.123
The Supreme Court has also denied bail to several activists who were convicted of Maoist conspiracies and instigating the Bhima Koregoan riots based
on extremely insubstantial evidence and have allowed them to be imprisoned
for over two years without a conviction.124 It even refused to allow one of the
imprisoned activists temporary release to seek treatment for COVID-19.125
During the last few years, most free speech decisions have been those that forward the BJP agenda or are ones that it had no objection to.126
The Supreme Court’s most jarring decision-making came in ways that did
not receive as much scrutiny as they deserve. The case that perhaps might
have the most severe concerns for India is the one concerning electoral bonds.
Electoral bonds were special promissory instruments issued by the central government, which allowed individuals and corporations to make donations to
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political parties anonymously.127 There is a fear that these bonds will lead to
the influx of black money and allow corporations to make political donations
without disclosing them.128 Despite the law being passed in 2017, the Supreme
Court heard a petition in March 2019, when most of the electoral bonds had
already been procured. It has not issued a verdict on its legality to this date.129
Apart from the case of the electoral bonds, another case whose impact
might be felt far beyond the case at hand was K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India, which concerned the Aadhar Act or the identity authentication bill. In
this case, the Supreme Court allowed the BJP government to pass a legislation that concerned identity authentication as a Money Bill.130 Money Bills
related to the spending and receiving of money by the Union government are
not required to go through the Upper House of the Parliament. Since the BJP
government, at the start of its first term, did not have a majority in the Upper
House, it passed the Aadhar Act as a Money Bill. The Supreme Court had held
that the government could do so because a single section of the Act provided
for the use of the Aadhar Number for availing benefits, subsidies, and services,
which incurred expenses on the Consolidated Fund of India.131 Thus, this judgment essentially allowed the government to pass an act which it could not have
done if the normal legislative process mandated by the Constitution prevailed.
Decisions such as this have tremendous potential of removing ‘veto points’
from the political system, resulting in abuse and the concentration of power.132
Admittedly, an overview of the Supreme Court today would be disingenuous without mentioning some of its positive decisions. Since the start of the
BJP rule, the Supreme Court has struck down Section 377 of the Indian Penal
Code, which criminalised homosexuality,133 Section 497 of the Indian Penal
Code, which criminalised adultery,134 and Section 66A of the Information
and Technology Act, which gave arbitrary powers to the authorities to police
online speech.135 Although otherwise a destabilising decision in many ways, the
Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India declared that despite no
textual mention, ‘the right to privacy’ was protected under the Constitution.136
Additionally, in the previously described Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of
India, the Supreme Court had decreed that ‘internet access’ is essential to both
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the Freedom of Speech and the Freedom of Trade under the Constitution.137
The Supreme Court’s midnight intervention in the Karnataka Assembly Case
is also noteworthy. In this case, the Supreme Court stalled the Karnataka
Governor’s decision to invite the BJP-led coalition to form the government,
despite the coalition not having the requisite majority and ordered a floor
test immediately so that horse-trading could not be carried out.138 This decision ultimately led to the Janata Dal United and INC coalition forming a government. The Supreme Court had comparably intervened in the Arunachal
Pradesh Assembly crisis and overruled the decision of the Governor declaring
President’s rule in the state.139 Akin to the Karnataka instance, the Supreme
Court verdict led to an INC government in the state.
The Supreme Court’s positive decisions highlight one crucial thing, i.e.,
though the government’s ‘tolerance interval’ is small and the Supreme Court
is not ready to go against the BJP government (and in some cases actively
support it), it is ready to (1) declare rights to be protected by the Constitution
without giving remedies in individual cases (2) decide significant albeit low
stake matters which do not have significant opposition from the government (3)
insist on adhering to democratic procedures at the state level. It is imperative
to understand this ‘tolerance interval’ to be able to help guide how the operation of constitutionalism should be rethought in India.

IV. TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE SUPREME COURT
Even if the numerous challenges with SCCC were not enough, with the
Supreme Court, visibly not protecting the Constitution and its promises, there
was never a more pressing need in India for ‘Taking the Constitution Away
from the Supreme Court’. ‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme
Court’ would require the battles for the guarantees of the Indian Constitution
to be predominantly fought outside the Supreme Court rather than within it.
This is not an easy endeavour and would entail a lot from the numerous players in the system.
To start with, every concerned actor who helped usher in India’s SCCC
would now instead have to prioritise building efficient organisations140 (including but not limited to civil society organisations)141 and strengthening
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existing ones. In the 1800s, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote about how organisations were central to the American republic’s initial success.142 A recent
cross-country empirical analysis by Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg substantiated Tocqueville’s observations in the comparative context and showed how
the promise of Constitutions is realised when dedicated organisations fight for
rights and freedoms.143
Constitutions can promise a lot, but without organisations to push for their
attainment, these promises are reduced to mere words on paper. Only when
a polity has efficient organisations does it see improved governance, democracy, and fundamental freedoms.144 As Charles Epp has highlighted, this is true
even if a country has independent courts that can give favourable constitutional
decisions.145 In India, there is no shortage of organisations (particularly civil
society organisations),146 but most of these organisations are functionally weak
and require work to be done on them.147
The raison d’etre why the starting point for ‘Taking the Constitution Away
from the Supreme Court’ is developing and strengthening organisational
machinery, is because as Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg contend - organisations help overcome problems of coordination and collective action.148 The
coordination problem can manifest in two ways. Firstly, when citizens are
unsure about what the government owes to them in a constitutional regime or
what transgressions by the government are impermissible per the Constitution.
Secondly, when citizens are unsure and divided about what strategies they need
to pursue to actualise the promises of the Constitution.
In the 21st century, governments frame anti-democratic actions under the
guise of law or justify them as essential for the greater good or to protect some
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other right.149 They also derelict their duties using propaganda to divert attention from problems or diminishing their magnitude.150 They employ courts to
give their actions the facade of judicial legitimacy.151 These strategies are way
too familiar in present-day India. In such situations, citizens might doubt the
constitutional permissibility of acts of commission or omissions by the government. When coordination problems exist, it becomes extremely easy for
the government to dismiss complaints and criticism regarding its policies and
actions.
Dedicated organisations can help overcome the coordination challenge by
persuading citizens that specific actions are constitutionally impermissible
irrespective of what the government or the courts are saying.152 In other cases,
they could persuade the populace that the Constitution would demand a particular behaviour on the government’s part. In a global south country with a
weak constitutional culture such as India, organisations can also assist in framing issues in ways that can capture the collective imagination of the populace,
as opposed to a handful of elites.153
Beyond the coordination problem, many instances of compelling governments to adhere to or implement the constitution are only effective when
a critical mass of citizens is applying pressure on the government.154 This is
the gist of the collective action problem.155 Small movements are rarely able
to make governments change their ways.156 Governments can easily suppress
small movements and even label them as ‘extremists’ or, in Indian terms, as
‘anti-nationals’.157 The large crowds’ making noise forces the government to
rethink their moves or pressure them to undertake actions since the costs of
suppressing them are incredibly high.
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Nevertheless, getting people to mobilise and act collectively is not easy. Cit
izens participation is influenced by their beliefs about the involvement of others’, and they will turn out if they can be assured that they will not be alone.158
This is where organisations can come into the picture and ensure large crowds
by assuring citizens that others will join them.159 To do this, certain organisations can even draw upon their member bases.
Because of coordination and collective action problems, SCCC appeared as
an attractive tool in India. PIL was an uncomplicated route for a few dedicated
individuals to take it upon themselves to try and achieve change. This did not
require any considerable machinery, coordination, or collective action. Yet,
as was demonstrated in the previous parts, SCCC was not an optimal mechanism to effectuate the constitution. Likewise, the chances of attaining progressive outcomes at the present-day Supreme Court are so scant that SCCC might
frequently result in unwanted decisions. This could push the fight for a particular issue a few years behind due to the legitimacy that comes with judicial
sanctification.
Building efficient organisations and strengthening existing ones is just one
step in ‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme Court’. There is still
the question of the strategies that would be needed to be undertaken by organisations. As organisations in India work towards ‘Taking the Constitution Away
from the Supreme Court’, one of the most important tactics they will have to
adopt is interacting ardently and building connections with different government levels.
At the end of the day, it is the government that must enforce or abide by the
Constitution. When the government is mooting proposals, organisations with
ties to the government can indicate to the government how their initiatives are
not in compliance with the Constitution.160 This provides the government with
the knowledge that there might be repercussions for its actions and allows it to
change track.161 Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg found this to be a far more
effective strategy than litigation to ensure that the government does not violate
the Constitution.162 Petitioning the government could also facilitate them taking
immediate action and passing certain laws needed in a country and required by
the Constitution.
Organisations in India should not be wary about the latter, thinking that
the government is beyond redemption. Even in non-democratic regimes,
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organisations have found success in convincing the government to enforce the
Constitution.163 In India itself, it resulted from tireless engagement with the
government by a handful of grassroots organisations that legislations such as
the Right to Education Act and the Right to Information Act were passed.164
At times engaging directly with the government might not be enough. As
was mentioned earlier, some of the most efficient tools for convincing the
government to comply with the Constitution require collective action. Erica
Chenoweth and Maria Stephan have shown how civil resistance in boycotts,
strikes, protests, and organised non-cooperation between 1990-2006 achieved
53% success across the globe in challenging entrenched power exacting political concessions.165 It does not require any empirical exploration to know that
this number is undoubtedly greater than what SCCC has achieved in India.
Tools of civil resistance also become very vital in the shaky footing which
India finds itself in.166 Organised civil resistance helped African countries like
Senegal and Burkina Faso ensure that their dictators do not hold power indefinitely, which has been a recurring problem in the African continent.167
India’s own history should give a lot to be optimistic about. Unlike some
countries, India does not have the challenge of getting the populace to come
out on the streets. After all, India had obtained freedom because of a massive
civil resistance movement. Even post-Independence, there have been several
instances of large-scale civil resistance movements and in particular, those
bearing fruits. In modern times, two of the biggest mobilisations in the wake
of the Delhi Rape in 2012 and the India Against Corruption Movement in
2011-2012 led to the passage of legislations like the Sexual Harassment at the
Workplace Act, The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, and the Lokpal Act. The
recent 2020 farmer protests organised by different agrarian unions168 is another
example that shows not only how Indians are ready to mobilise to fight for
their rights but also the role organisations can play in ‘Taking the Constitution
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Away from the Court’ and how the government finds it hard to ignore pressure
imposed by numbers.169
Sceptics might point to the lack of success of the early 2020 anti-CAA protests and the corresponding crackdown by the BJP government as the problem with civil resistance movements. However, if anything, these protests are
to be looked at as a silver lining. The anti-CAA protests were disorganised,
spontaneous and lacked support from structured civil society. Despite these
hurdles, these protests were able to garner tremendous numbers.170 It was also
perhaps the first time the Constitution managed to catch the public imagination in India, with protest sites seeing collective readings of the Preamble to
the Constitution.171 The BJP government could clamp down on these protests
because they suffered from a coordination problem and lack of organisation.
An interruption by the unanticipated COVID-19 pandemic also turned out to
be a blessing in disguise for the government as many protests were cancelled,
and others saw reduced crowds because of the pandemic induced lockdown.172
Lack of coordination and collective action is precisely why the BJP government has been able to imprison activists and censure them. If movements have
the organisation and numbers, it becomes impossible for the government to
suppress them.173
When it comes to mobilising the citizenry, a valuable instrument in the
activist toolbox is social media. In the 21st century, social media has turned
out to be a potent instrument to gain support. Social media was integral to
ensuring that people initially get involved in causes.174 Important movements
like the Arab Spring, #Metoo, and Black Lives Matter all initially used social
media to gain support and mobilise citizens. A word of caution is mandated
here. Like SCCC, organisations need to be circumspect about being over-reliant on social media and should not get carried away because its use makes
things easier. Movements solely restricted to social media face coordination hurdles and lack the requisite strategic decision-making and planning
169
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capabilities.175 Such movements can also be limited in their reach and might
have trouble penetrating all levels of society, especially in a society like India,
where socio-economic realities restrict internet access.176 Because of these
weaknesses, movements restricted to social media can fail to have the requisite
impact, and organisations must rely on it with caution.
Apart from the aforesaid, there are several other tools available to organisations. Organisations can attempt to work with the political opposition to turn
voters against an incumbent who is diluting the constitution.177 After all, it is
in the interest of organisations to facilitate the rotation of power. Democracy
in the post-world war era is understood as a form of government that permits
the rotation of power.178 For democracy to thrive, it requires incumbents to lose
elections from time to time.179 When re-election is guaranteed, ruling parties
do not see any incentives to respond to public opinions, let alone respond to
opposition voices.180
In times like today, when the opposition is severely broken in India, organisations could help opposition parties sustain. Knowing that rotation of power is
imperative for their interests, organisations could help opposition parties understand what they would need to do to garner different groups’ support.181 When
convinced that opposition parties would support their causes, organisations
with vast grassroots networks could help opposition parties attain the muchneeded support essential for them to win against the BJP government.182 The
BJP’s growth with the aid of grassroots organisations like the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is strong evidence of how
organisations can help opposition parties even within dominant party systems.
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Lastly, although SCCC is not desirable as the primary tactic, the Supreme
Court still has a role to play depending on the ‘tolerance interval’ in a given
time and space. The Supreme Court could facilitate solving coordination
problems and give conformity to specific issues as being unconstitutional
or required by the constitution.183 As was seen earlier, the Supreme Court
has been ready to do this, even in today’s challenging political environment.
Moreover, when it comes to collective action, the Supreme Court can also be
beneficial. Supreme Court decisions can help translate mere claims to constitutional rights.184 With a constitutional right to mobilise around, it becomes
easy for organisations to get citizens to rally for a particular cause.185 In other
instances, such as in the cases concerning the street vendors in metropolitan
areas, organisations strategically approached the Supreme Court to enable them
to buy time while addressing the coordination and collective action problems.186
Besides, it is not always that the Supreme Court is the incorrect forum to
attain a specific goal. It might be possible that Supreme Court litigation could
help attain certain goals. For example, some issues (particularly when they
are not misaligned with governmental or majoritarian preferences) might need
comparatively lesser post-litigation activism and lobbying to come into effect.
A favourable decision could go a long way in forwarding those issues. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in the cases decriminalising adultery and homosexuality are possible examples of the same. While the underlying causes with
respect to these issues need way more than merely getting laws struck off the
books, the Supreme Court could still be a viable option for organisations to
pursue to initially get the respective laws repealed.
Nevertheless, organisations need to realise that approaching the Supreme
Court prematurely and without a minimal level of support can, occasionally,
hurt their cause. Only a couple of years before the Supreme Court in Navtej
Singh Johar v. Union of India decriminalised homosexuality, it had upheld the
constitutional validity of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.187 It took the
LGBTQ+ movement a couple of years to garner support for their cause from
several political parties as well as from within the ruling BJP government188
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before they could re-approach the Supreme Court and attain a favourable
outcome.
Likewise, organisations on achieving satisfactory decisions should not think
that the issue is settled and cease labouring further.189. Organisations need to
remember that even if there are independent courts that can give favourable
decisions, they still have much work to do to ensure the implementation of the
decisions.190 This applies even in instances when organisations have succeeded
in having the government pass favourable legislation. The successful implementation of legislations will often require the continual application of pressure
on the government.

V. EPILOGUE
In suggesting ‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme Court,’ this
article might have raised more questions than it potentially answers. How long
should the project of ‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme Court’
be? How should the Supreme Court see its own role in a post-SCCC world?
What is the role of high courts in this new regime? How can the populace
be convinced that certain actions are constitutionally impermeable in a country with a weak constitutional culture like India? How can the constitutional
culture be improved in India? Which issues in India need the most prioritisation? What are the best strategies to adopt for which issue? How much does
the ‘Constitution’ as a document matter in a post-SCCC world? How to tackle
actors who would resist an alteration to SCCC? Would the Supreme Court need
redesigning to better accommodate a post-SCCC world?
Further, considering the important part organisations must play in this proposed regime, the shortcomings of organisations is an unavoidable conversation to be had.191 In the SCCC regime, the flaws of organisations got concealed
because the Supreme Court occupied such a prominent place. Additionally,
approaching the Supreme Court did not require full-fledged organisations, and
often a handful of lawyers or activists were enough. Organisations in India are
also middle class dominated and often do not involve themselves in the problems of the average Indian.192
On the other hand, many organisations are governed by narrow ethnic,
regional, communal, and linguistic considerations, which also affect their
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effectiveness.193 Organisations in a global south society with as many problems as India also jump from issue to issue and infrequently take things over
the finish line.194 Even when organisations manage small gains, they consider
issues as won and move on without pursuing them to the enforcement stage.
These limited outrage cycles make sustained advocacy extremely difficult.195
The eventual success of ‘Taking the Constitution Away from the Supreme
Court’ would depend on organisations keeping aside their own narrow agendas. It would also require them to engage in effective and sustained dialogues
with not only the government but also with each other as well as stakeholders,
such as the opposition and the public.196
Nonetheless, in the choice between SCCC and ‘Taking the Constitution
Away from the Supreme Court,’ there are few rational reasons to stick with
the former. Many problems with the organisational system in India are
amplified on a far larger scale with SCCC. It is simply not prudent that the
Supreme Court is the sole battleground for the Constitution. Moreover, with
the full-frontal assaults that the BJP government is launching on the Indian
Constitution, coupled with the Supreme Court’s present decision-making, new
tactics are necessary sooner than later. A few lawyers and activists litigating
in the Supreme Court is a losing strategy.197 Additionally, the longer SCCC is
persisted with, it will only delay realising the Constitution’s entire range of
promises.198
Actors who were instrumental in India’s SCCC must show faith in the
Indian populace’s ability to rise. They would also have to have faith in
their own capacity to get the Indian population to join the fight for preserving the Indian Constitution’s soul. Although realising India’s transformative
Constitution is a long-term vision that might require work and time, present
threats to the Indian Constitution can and should be addressed outside the
Supreme Court’s courtrooms. If it were possible in countries with grimmer
ground realities than India, it is surely possible here.199 Perhaps until the organisational machinery can be fully nurtured, the extant organisational system
would need to ‘step up their game’ and give its 300%.
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For the time being, this article will conclude with the hope that the future
of India’s Constitution is not left in the sole hands of the Supreme Court.
The experiment with SCCC, if not a failed one, has not been the most successful one either. The fight to achieve the ultimate promises of the Indian
Constitution is a long one and one that would need far more to be done outside
the Supreme Court than within it.

